Road to Uniformity in Real Estate Taxation: Valuation and Appeal by Editors,
THE ROAD TO UNIFORMITY IN REAL
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I. INTRODUCTION
The property tax, long a principal source of state revenue,
remains a bulwark of local government finance.' Recent studies
indicate that nearly half of all monies raised by local govern-
ments are derived from real estate taxes.2 As the costs assumed
by local governments rise,3 and as property tax rates are in-
creased to supply the needed revenue, attention properly fo-
cuses on the procedures employed in assessing property, and the
uniformity of the resulting taxation scheme.
4
With only minor variations, the structure of the real estate
tax systems in all states is similar. 5 The local assessor in each
taxing district 6 appraises all real property-land and fixed
improvements.7 Tax rates" are then set at a level which will gen-
erate the needed revenue. Shortly thereafter, the tax rolls9 are
I Cf. Comment, Equality in Taxation-Houston's Constitutional Dilemma, 10 Hous. L.
REV. 656, 657 (1973).
'JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. OF CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 90TH CONG., 2D
SESS., IMPACT OF THE PROPERTY TAX-ITs ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN PROB-
LEMS 6 (Joint Comm. Print 1968); Welch, The Way We Were: Four Decades of Change in
the Property Tax, in ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROP-
ERTY TAX IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT]; Comment, supra note 1, at 657.
'See C. SCHULTZE, E. FRIED, A. RIVLIN & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES, THE 1973 BUDGET 291-305 (1972).
4 See generally J. KEITH, PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT PRACTICES 201-04 (1966).
1 See generally CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2.
6 A major change in the past fifteen years has been the emergence of the county as
the principal assessment and taxation district. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. County of
Alameda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 371, 85 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Deitch Co. v. Board of Property
Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397 (1965). A notable exception to the trend is
Ohio, which has adopted a statewide unit for purposes of tax uniformity. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 16 Ohio St. 2d 85, 88, 242 N.E.2d 887,
889 (1968) (per curiam).
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 3 (1973) ("Real estate for the purpose of
taxation shall include all land within the commonwealth and all buildings and other
things erected thereon or affixed thereto.").
8 Tax rates are commonly expressed as $X for every $100 of assessed value, other-
wise known as "millages." Assessed value is the value of the real estate as set by the local
assessor. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 19-i301 (1974) ($1.975 per $100 assessed
value).
9 Tax rolls are records kept by the assessor which contain the assessed value and
the tax liability of all real property within the taxing district. See J. KEITH, supra note 4,
at 278-83.
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made public by the local assessor or assessment board;10 a tax-
payer who disputes the assessment of his property may seek
relief from the assessor or, if necessary, from the local appeals
board. Many jurisdictions have also established statewide appeals
boards which review the determinations of the local appeals
boards." After exhausting available administrative remedies,1 2
the taxpayer may seek judicial review of the assessment. 3
Although the real estate tax assessment systems of ten or
twenty years ago' 4 might justly have been termed an "Augean
stable,"' 5 during the last twenty years, many states have made
herculean efforts to conform their procedures to legal require-
ments, contained principally in state constitutions and statutes.'
6
This Comment will review some of the recent attempts to rem-
edy old problems, and will examine the nature and effectiveness
of administrative and judicial remedies, in light of the goal of a
fair and uniform tax system. This Comment will focus on several
states with high concentrations of developed real estate: Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania.
II. CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM
The typical real estate tax assessment system of twenty years
ago fell short of federal and state legal requirements for several
reasons.' 7 Local assessors were often political appointees lacking
experience in the valuation of property.18 Instances of corrup-
tion were not unknown.' 9 Assessors in densely populated areas
10 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-508 to -510 (1968).
11See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-111 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
58A, § 1 (1973).
12 See note 201 infra & accompanying text.
3 See text accompanying notes 201-18 infra.
14 See generally CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2; Carr, Protest, Appeal, and Judi-
cial Review-Property Assessments, 39 CAL. S.B.J. 877, 885, 890-91, 893 (1964); Hellerstein,
Judicial Review of Property Tax Assessments, 14 TAX L. REV. 327 (1959); Note, Inequality in
Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for an Old Ill, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1374 (1962).
15 One of the twelve labors that Herakles (Hercules) was ordered to perform was
the cleaning of King Augeas's stables. Although the stables had been fouled for thirty
years by 3,000 cattle, Herakles diverted two rivers and accomplished the task in a single
day. M. GRANT & J. HAZEL, WHO'S WHO IN CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 219 (1973); C.
KERENYI, THE HEROES OF THE GREEKS 151-53 (1959).
16 See text accompanying notes 31-58 infra.
17 See generally, Carr, supra note 14, at 878-79; Hellerstein, supra note 14; Note,
supra note 14, at 1377-80.
18 See G. BENSON, S. BENSON, H. MCCLELLAND & P. THOMSON, THE AMERICAN
PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 3 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as BENSON]; Welch, supra note 2, at 30-32.
19 See, e.g., Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 8 Cal.
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were often unable to keep assessments current with fluctuating
property values. 20 As a result, comparable properties were as-
sessed, and therefore taxed, at different percentages of actual
value, 21 in violation of the uniformity requirements of federal
and state law, and the full value assessment requirements of state
law. Where litigants were able to persuade a court to order com-
pliance with these requirements, however, the legislature often
responded by changing the requirements so as to validate exist-
ing practices. Legislative efforts to increase the uniformity of the
system have consisted primarily of facilitating taxpayer appeals,
particularly by providing access to data compiled by assessors.
2 2
A. Bases for Taxpayer Challenges
1. Federal Constitutional Requirements
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution requires that all property
within a given class be taxed equally.23 In considering the con-
stitutionality of a tax, courts examine the taxation scheme as
applied to the individual taxpayer's property.24 Although this
rule appears to provide sufficient protection to property owners,
the Supreme Court has limited the fourteenth amendment's pro-
tection to cases in which there has been "intentional" and "sys-
tematic" discrimination in the assessment of the taxpayer's
property.25 It has not sufficed for a taxpayer to prove merely
that a mistake, incidental to the system, was made in the
3d 942, 506 P.2d 1019, 106 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1973) (indicating that an assessor had been
charged with criminal misconduct). For a discussion of the impact of Bauer-Schweitzer,
see Buckley, The Bauer-Schweitzer Case: Expanding the Power to Levy Escape Assessments, 49
L.A.B. BULL. 464 (1974).
20 Comment, supra note 1, at 661. The problem is that properties within the district
will fluctuate differently; therefore, the retention of "old" assessed values will cause
inequality. If property values fluctuated at a uniform proportional rate, the currency of
the assessments would be irrelevant.
21 Despite some variation in phrasing, all states base property taxation on market
value. See notes 99-105 infra & accompanying text; BENSON, supra note 18, at 3.
22 See notes 80-84 & accompanying text infra.
23 See Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Cumber-
land Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1931);
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1918); cf.
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 38 (1907).
24 See American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455 (1965); Comment, supra note 1,
at 663-64.
25 See Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23, _
28-29 (1931); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923); Sun-
day Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1918).
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assessment: 26 exact uniformity and equality are not constitu-
tional requirements.2" More importantly, the Supreme Court has
recognized the state's right to classify property for purposes of
taxation;2 8 a classification will be upheld if it has a rational
basis.29 The ability to classify enables the state to tax some types
of real property more heavily than others, thereby frustrating
the policy of equality.30
2. State Constitutions and Statutes
Given the limited scope of fourteenth amendment protec-
tion, and the difficult burden of proving "intentional" and "sys-
tematic" discrimination, taxpayers turned to state law. Most state
constitutions required either "uniformity"3' 1 or "proportion-
al[ity]"3 2 in the taxation of all property within a class; this re-
quirement could not be met simply by the avoidance of inten-
tional discrimination.33 In addition, many courts held that real
property was a single class and that all types, such as residential,
industrial, and commercial, must be treated equally.3 4 When
26 Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 824 U.S. 182 (1945); Chicago
Great W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1924) (dictum); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918).
27 Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Welch v. Henry, 305
U.S. 134 (1938); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
28 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Alward v. Johnson,
282 U.S. 509 (1931); Comment, supra note 1, at 659. See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1973); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).
29 New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938).
30 Equality is satisfied for federal constitutional purposes if there is no "intentional"
and "systematic" discrimination either in the assessment or taxation of real property. See
notes 25-29 supra & accompanying text; cf. Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 141-42
(1925). Equality under state law has evolved into a requirement of equal taxation as an
end result. See notes 31-58 infra & accompanying text.
2 1E.g., PA. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
3 2E.g., MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. 4.
3 See, e.g., Hutensky v. Town of Avon, 163 Conn. 433, 311 A.2d 92 (1972); Shop-
pers' World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 348 Mass. 366, 203 N.E.2d 811 (1965); Ed
Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 41 App. Div. 2d 479, 344 N.Y.S.2d 270, aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d
440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1973); McKnight Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 234, 209 A.2d 389 (1965). In some states, how-
ever, the burden is met by merely proving that the assessor used accepted methods of
valuation. See notes 203-05 infra & accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d
563 (1957), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 929 (1960); Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343
Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961); In re Appeals of Kents, Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763
(1961); State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195
N.E.2d 908 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1966); Bohl Foundation v. Board of
Property Assessment, 407 Pa. 567, 180 A.2d 900 (1962); cf. Idaho Tel. Co. v. Baird, 91
Idaho 425, 423 P.2d 337 (1967).
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taxpayers challenged the inequality of many state systems, the
basis for attack was that assessment procedures violated these
state constitutional mandates.
3 5
B. Taxpayers Challenge the System
1. Switz v. Township of Middletown
The seminal case of a full-scale attack on the validity of real
estate tax systems was Switz v. Township of Middletown.36 The
plaintiff in Switz sought a writ of mandamus ordering the local
assessor to comply with state statutes requiring "true value"
assessment 37 and the equalization of all assessments within the
county.38 In New Jersey, as in many jurisdictions, local assessors
commonly ignored the statutory mandate to assess each parcel of
real property at one hundred percent of market value. 39 The
result was a system in which properties in the same class were
assessed at different percentages of market value, and the per-
centages were so widely divergent that no percentage could be
termed a common level of assessment. 40 To compound the prob-
lem, taxpayers were unable to discover this practice since they
lacked access to assessment records. The New Jersey statute re-
quired one-hundred-percent assessment and therefore taxpayers
assessed at ninety percent may have believed that they had been
underassessed. In fact, the average percentage within the taxing
district was about fifty percent.4' The court in Switz recognized
the inherent unfairness of "secret" fractional assessment,42 and
granted a writ ordering the assessor to conform to the legal
requirement of full value assessment.
3 5 See generally Carr, supra note 14.
36 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957). For a thorough discussion of the New Jersey
real estate tax assessment system, including consideration of the historic importance of
Switz, see Comment, County Tax Equalization and the Page 8 Formula: Fairness the Hard
Way, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 576 (1973).
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-2.25-.26 (1960).
38
See Hammond, Real Property Tax Assessment: A Look at its Administration Practices
and Procedures, 38 ALBANY L. REv. 498, 514 (1974).
" Two reasons for this state of affairs were the inability of assessors to keep asses-
sed values current, see note 20 supra & accompanying text, and the mistaken belief that
assessors were permitted to assess different types of property at different percentages
of market value, see note 34 supra & accompanying text.40See Note, supra note 14, at 1378.
41 This may well have been the result of failure to keep valuations current with
market values, rather than willful misfeasance.
42 See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra. It was this secrecy that led many au-
thorities to support the full-value assessment requirement. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 14,
at 885.
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2. Cases After Switz
The Switz case had a major impact in a number of other
jurisdictions. In Massachusetts the real estate tax assessment sys-
tem was successfully attacked on state constitutional and statu-
tory grounds in Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield.43 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that proposed assessments
based upon widely differing percentages of "fair cash value"
44
for different classes of real property violated state law. 45 Al-
though it recognized that a tax system could not be expected to
achieve exact equality or proportionality, the Bettigole court con-
cluded that the assessors had disregarded the constitutional and
statutory requirements of full value assessment. An injunction,
rather than a reduction of the individual assessments, 46 was re-
quired in order to curtail the illegal practices.47
No set of cases better exemplifies the tortuous road to uni-
formity than the Park Investment Co. cases.48 The original Park
case 49 was a mandamus proceeding to reduce the percentage
assessments on commercial property in Cuyahoga County, Ohio
to the percentage of full value that was applied to residential
property. The court granted the writ and held that all real prop-
erty must be assessed at a uniform percentage of actual value.
50
Although full value assessment was required by statute, the court
held that where fractional assessment was the practice, the per-
centage of full value must be relatively uniform throughout the
43 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).
44 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 9 (1973).
45 MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. 4, requires that all assessments of real prop-
erty be "proportional." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 38 (1973) provides that the
proportionality required by the state constitution is to be achieved by assessing each
parcel at its fair cash value. See Note, supra note 14, at 1374. See also Stone v. City of
Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 168 N.E.2d 76 (1960); Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339
Mass. 89, 157 N.E.2d 880 (1959).
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 59 (1973).
41Cf. Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946) (individual
abatement granted despite the availability of injunctive relief).
48 State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 32 Ohio St. 2d 28, 289
N.E.2d 579 (1972) (per curiam); State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 31
Ohio St. 2d 183, 285 N.E.2d 356 (1972); State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964). For
a history of the Park cases and an overview of the Ohio system, see Note, Real Property
Assessment in Ohio, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 840 (1969).
19 State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195
N.E.2d 908 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964).
50 Ohio law provides that all realty, regardless of nature or use, may be assessed
and taxed only by a uniform rule based on value. OHIO CONST. art. 12, § 2; OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 5713.01 (Page Supp. 1975).
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state51 and among the various classes of real property.52
Despite its initial success, the Park Investment Company re-
peatedly returned to court in pursuit of an effective remedy.
During the protracted litigation, the Ohio legislature effectively
postponed implementation of the first Park decision.53 In 1972,
Park moved to require the Board of Tax Appeals to show cause
why it was not in contempt for failure to perform its duties in
accordance with the writ of mandamus issued in 1965. The Su-
preme Court of Ohio respected the intervening statutory revi-
sion and denied the motion, thereby permitting the legislative
reform package to proceed. 54 Under the new law, uniform frac-
tional assessment was required within each taxing district.
The outcome in Pennsylvania was similar. The Pennsylvania
Constitution provides that all taxes shall be uniform for the same
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax.55 In 1965 a group of commercial-property owners
challenged the Allegheny County assessment system which taxed
commerical property at a higher percentage of full value than
other classes of property. 56 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the proper taxing district was the county and read the
constitutional provision as determining that all real property was
a single class entitled to uniform treatment.57 Significantly, the
opinion indicated that uniform fractional assessment was an ac-
ceptable practice despite an explicit statutory requirement of full
value assessment.
58
51 Ohio is one of the few jurisdictions that require statewide uniformity. See note
6 supra.
52 175 Ohio St. at 413, 195 N.E.2d at 910.
53 See Note, supra note 48, at 847-48.
54 State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 34 Ohio St, 2d 28, 289
N.E.2d 579 (1972) (per curiam).
55 PA. CONST. art. 8, § 1. See Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa.
213, 218, 209 A.2d 397, 400 (1965). See generally Blauner's, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 330 Pa.
340, 198 A. 889 (1938).
56 Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397 (1965);
McKnight Shopping Center, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 234, 209
A.2d 389 (1965); Morris v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 192, 209 A.2d 407
(1965); Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc. v. Board of
Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 243, 209 A.2d 394 (1965); Appeal of Rieck Ice Cream
Co., 417 Pa. 249, 209 A.2d 383 (1965). These cases were decided the same day, and all
utilized a special computer study of assessments in Allegheny County to prove that
inequality did in fact exist.
57 Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397 (1965).
58 Id. at 217-18, 209 A.2d at 400-01.
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C. Legislative Reactions
The courts in Switz59 and its progeny, 60 recognizing that
"[c]haotic dispersion of assessment ratios constitutes arbitrariness
and lack of rational classification . . . ," sought to force the
reform of assessment systems. 61 Widespread noncompliance with
statutory mandates of full value assessment had produced severe
inequalities in the effective ratio of tax paid to full market value.
In an effort to achieve uniformity, some courts mandated full
value assessment in the face of the general practice of fractional
assessment. In short, the courts ordered the impossible; the legis-
latures were compelled to intervene.
1. Fractional Assessment
The legislative response was to legalize fractional assessment
by setting either a fixed percentage of full value,62 a variable
range, or an upper limit,63 or by requiring the local assessor to
choose some percentage to be applied uniformly within the
district.64 Under the last approach, each taxpayer was entitled to
have his assessment levied according to this uniform percentage,
often referred to as the common ratio. 65 The effect of this revi-
sion was to conform the law of real property taxes to the existing
assessment practices rather than the reverse. For example, it had
been the practice of Connecticut assessors to assess at sixty per-
cent of market value, despite a statutory requirement of one-
hundred-percent assessment. This practice, although declared
illegal in E. Ingraham Co. v. Town and City of Bristol,66 was subse-
9 Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).60 See. e.g., E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d
563 (1957), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 929 (1960); Hellerstein v. Assessor of the Town of
Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975).
61 Note, supra note 14, at 1388. See In re Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21,
166 A.2d 763 (1961).
62 For example, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals, property is taxed at about 40% of market value. See OHIO TAX STUDY
COMMISSION, THE STATE AND LOCAL TAX STRUCTURE IN OHIO 52 (1967); Note, supra
note 48, at 844.
63 CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 401 (West 1970) ("Every assessor shall assess all prop-
erty subject to general property taxation . . . in the county at a publicly announced
ratio of his own choosing which shall be between 20 and 25 percent of full cash value."),
as amended, (Supp. 1976) (25% set ratio); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5715.01 (Page 1973)
(50% maximum).
64 See, e.g., Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessments, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397
(1965).
65 See text accompanying notes 179-89 infra.
66 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 929 (1960).
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quently validated by the Connecticut General Assembly. 67
Commentators have disagreed over the relative merits of
full value assessment and fractional assessment.6 8 The principal
argument for full value assessment has been that the taxpayer
can discover any overassessment at the time he is niotified of his
assessment. He need only compare the assessed value of his
property with his own estimate of its market value.69 Early notice
of overassessment is important should the taxpayer choose to
appeal, because many jurisdictions have restrictive statutes of
limitations 70  which are inflexibly applied. 71 A further point
urged on behalf of full value assessment is that it lessens the
taxpayer's problem of proof. A court or appeal board can re-
solve the claim of overassessment simply by ascertaining the ac-
tual market value of the property.
72
This position fails to distinguish between "secret" fractional
assessment7 3 and legislatively authorized fractional assessment.
In the former case, where a statutory requirement of full value
assessment is disregarded, the taxpayer cannot determine
'7 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-64 (1972). The New Jersey legislature enacted a
similar law following the Switz case. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-2.25 (1960). Several
months after the New York Court of Appeals ordered compliance with the statutory
requirement of full value assessment, the state legislature began consideration of a bill
that would legalize fractional assessment. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1976, at 30, col. 1.
6 
See CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at 2-13; Carr, supra note 14, at 685.
Avoiding the costs of converting to a full value assessment system where a frac-
tional assessment system is in use may be reason to retain the latter system. If the
existing system is so chaotic, however, that no "average" or "common" fractional level
can be identified, then a complete reappraisal will be necessary even if fractional as-
sessment is authorized by statute. The costs of converting may depend upon the nature
of the existing fractional assessments. The intentional and systematic application of dif-
ferent percentages to different groups of properties could be corrected more easily
than the random application of different percentages to similar properties. Conversion
will be especially burdensome if the assessments have not been kept current with
changes in market values. See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
69 See Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 348; Hezel, Residential Property Assessments in the
City of Buffalo: A Study of the Use of Administrative Discretion, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 411, 418
(1974).
7 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-55, -112 (1972) (no more than thirty
days); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:3-18, -21 (1960) (approximately 200 days); N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAw § 702 (McKinney 1972) (thirty days).
71 See, e.g., Danis v. Middlesex County Bd. of Taxation, 113 N.J. Super. 6, 272
A.2d 542 (App. Div. 1971); United Artists E. Theatres, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 76
Misc. 2d 26, 349 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1973).
72 See CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at 6; Hezel, supra note 69, at 419.
Market value multiplied by the common ratio equals assessed value. Where the ratio is
100%, market value equals assessed value. The point is important because often the
taxpayer's greatest obstacle lies in proving the existing common ratio. See Carr, supra
note 14, at 885-86.
" See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
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whether he has been overassessed7 4 unless he knows the average
percentage of market value actually applied in his district.7 5 On
the other hand, where fractional assessment (at a fixed percen-
tage or within an established range76) is authorized, the taxpayer
need only multiply the market value of his property by the pre-
scribed percentage and compare the result with the assessed
value of his property. In short, the early notice value is served
where the actual percentage applied by the assessor approxi-
mates the authorized percentage set out in the statute. The early
notice function does not turn on the latter being set at one
hundred percent. Similarly, the taxpayer's problem of proof on
appeal is not significantly more difficult where fractional assess-
ment is authorized than where full value assessment is required.
As long as the court or appeal board knows the percentage actu-
ally applied 77 by the assessor, it can resolve the claim of overas-
sessment. In an appropriate case, the taxpayer is free to prove
that the assessor has overstated the actual percentage in defend-
ing his assessment.
78
2. Access to Information
Although legislative reform efforts centered on the legaliza-
tion of fractional assessment, another important change was the
increased availability to taxpayers of a wide range of information
relevant to real estate taxation within the district. 79 Probably the
most comprehensive effort took place in California. In addition
to legalizing fractional assessment,80 the legislature in 1966 per-
" If a property owner thinks his property is to be assessed at its full market value,
as full value assessment would require, he is likely to remain silent if he believes that his
property is assessed at a lower percentage. Therefore, if his property is assessed at 75%
he will not appeal. In fact, the assessor may have created a system of "secret" assess-
ment at 60% and the hypothetical taxpayer actually has been overassessed. The prob-
lem is one of notice.
"See Welch, supra note 2, at 33.
See notes 62-65 supra & accompanying text.
7 See, e.g,, CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 401 (West Supp. 1976). A problem arises, in
the absence of a fixed percentage, if the assessor is not required to introduce the per-
centage he has applied. The taxpayer then faces an impossible task in attempting to
prove overassessment. See Ehrman, Administrative Appeal and Judicial Review of Property
Tax Assessments in California-The New Look, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 15 (1970).
78 See Sommer, A Summary of Current Real Estate Tax Assessment Protest and Judicial
Review in New York State, 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 475, 480 (1972).
79 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 1606 (West Supp. 1976); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5715.07 (Page 1973). See generally Ehrman, supra note 77, at 15-16.
80 The California legislature discovered that a fractional assessment system had
evolved in California and had created significant problems. At that time the California
Constitution, art. XI, § 12 required that all property be assessed at "full cash value,"
statutojrily defined as full market value, but the new law required only that assessments
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mitted the taxpayer access to much information formerly un-
available to him. This information included the percentage act-
ually applied by assessors within their districts, 81 the sales-ratio
data compiled by the state board of equalization,82 the methods
employed by the assessors in valuing property, 83 and the as-
sessed and market values assigned to other properties within the
districts.8 4 Information of this type facilitates the taxpayer's ef-
forts to secure uniform treatment, especially during the appeal
process. It is to that process that this Comment will now turn.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPEAL
Commentators have focused on administrative appeal and
judicial review of real estate tax assessments as the principal
means for achieving uniformity in the tax system.8 5 Although as
a matter of due process states are not required to provide judi-
cial review of assessments, 6 due process does require some type
of administrative appeal, with notice and hearing, before the
assessment becomes final.8 7 Because the valuation of property is
be set at a fixed fraction of "full cash value." See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 401 (West
1970), as amended, (Supp. 1976). The constitutionality of the measure was upheld in
County of Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 428 P.2d 593, 59 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1967) (en banc). See generally Red Bluff Developers v. Tehama County, 258 Cal. App.
2d 668, 66 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1968).
8' CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 401 (West 1970), as amended, (Supp. 1976). The prob-
lems faced by the taxpayer in proving that other properties are assessed at a rate lower
than that applied to his own property are discussed in text accompanying notes 179-200
infra.
82 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 1815, 1817-19 (West 1970), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
The nature of sales-ratio information and its potential value to the taxpayer are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 185-200 infra.
83 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 1606 (West Supp. 19'76). The various methods of de-
termining property value are discussed in text accompanying notes 98-178 infra.
84 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 1606 (West Supp. 1976). See Ehrman, supra note 77,
at 9.
85 Because appraisal is a particularly inexact science, and because assessors are
often unable to keep abreast of changes within the district, the appeal process is needed
to ascertain and remedy inequalities that arise from defects within the system as well as
those which result from arbitrary actions of the assessor. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 14;
Ehrman, supra note 77; Hellerstein, supra note 14; Hezel, supra note 69. "To the ex-
tent the initial assessment is properly made, the need to be concerned with . . .
administrative appeal and judicial review is considerably less." Carr, supra note 14,
at 878.
88 Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905). Most jurisdictions, -however,
do provide for judicial review. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58A, § 13 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 700 (McKinney 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5717.04-.05 (Page 1973).
87 See Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 327. Excessive assessments are not necessarily
reviewable unless they are fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious. Jeffery Apt. Bldg. Corp.
v. Harding, 347 Ill. 336, 179 N.E. 881 (1932). For a discussion of factors relevant to the
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far from an exact science,"" and because the methods used by
local assessors are often not made public, 89 an administrative
appeal is necessary both to afford the taxpayer a remedy and to
monitor the actions of the assessor.90
A. Administrative Appeal
The initial procedure in challenging an assessment is an
appeal to a local board of appeals. 91 The taxpayer bears the
burden of proving that the assessment is erroneous. He must
produce evidence showing that the property was overassessed92
in order to overcome the presumption of validity generally ac-
corded assessments.9 3 Such evidence may demonstrate either
that the market value of the property was lower than that de-
termined by the assessor, or that the assessor applied to that
value a higher percentage than (1) the actual common ratio or
(2) the prescribed common ratio. 4 Once the taxpayer provides
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the assessor must
introduce evidence supporting the validity of the assessment.95
The local board then determines the market value according to
the evidence, and applies the proper common ratio to calculate
the assessment. Similar procedures govern an appeal before a
nature of a hearing required by due process, see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
88 "As long as an assessment depends on such a subjective standard as the market
value of an item of property ... there will be sharp differences of opinion between the
taxpayer and the assessing authorities. What is important is that value be determined in
the same manner for everyone." Ehrman, supra note 77, at 4.
89 See Carr, supra note 14, at 879.
90 This is especially true in jurisdictions that have created statewide agencies, both
to handle appeals from local board decisions and to oversee the proper functioning and
equality of the state tax systems. See note 11 supra & accompanying text. For example,
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw §§ 1524, 1526 (McKinney 1972) creates boards of assessment
review that have primary responsibility for seeing that all real property within their
jurisdiction is assessed equally. See Hezel, supra note 69, at 412-14.
91 See generally Ehrman, supra note 77; Hellerstein, supra note 14; Hezel, supra note
69; Sommer, supra note 78.
9 2 E.g., Dickau v. Town of Glastonbury, 156 Conn. 437, 242 A.2d 777 (1968);
Broadway-Saranac Lake Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 43 App. Div. 2d, 349 N.Y.S.2d
830 (1973); Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397
(1965).93 E.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 8321(a) (1969); Sommer, supra note 78, at 485.
94 The market value must first be determined by appropriate valuation methods,
and the resulting figure is then reduced by the assessment ratio. See County of Sac-
ramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 848, 428 P.2d 593, 600, 59 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613
(1967) (en banc).
5 See, e.g., Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 221-22, 209
A.2d 397, 402 (1965); Sommer, supra note 78, at 485-86.
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statewide administrative appeals board,96 which is often permit-
ted to set the assessed value either above or below that fixed by
the local board or the assessor.
97
1. Determining Market Value
The key to uniform assessments, and the first point raised
on appeal, is the accurate valuation of the property." Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, real estate is required to be assessed at
"actual value," 99 "full cash value,"'10 0 "fair cash value,"10 1 "full
value,"12 or "true and actual value."' 0 3 All such standards have
been held to require assessment at market value,' 0 4 defined as
the price that the property would bring in a fair, arm's length
transaction between willing parties. 0 5
The three principal methods utilized in the valuation of real
estate are the comparable-sales method,10 6 the capitalization-of-
income method,'11 7 and the reproduction-cost-new-less-depreci-
ation (RCNLD) method.'0 8 Although each method is best suited
to a particular type of property, it is generally accepted that the
optimal valuation employs all three. °" For purposes of assess-
96 See notes 11, 90 supra & acccompanying text.
" See, e.g., Rek Inv. Co. v. City of Newark, 80 N.J. Super. 552, 557-58, 194 A.2d
368, 372 (App. Div. 1963).
9s See KEITH, supra note 4, at 42-43.
99 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-402 (1972).
100 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 401 (West 1970), as amended, (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 14 (1957).
'0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501(1) (1970); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 59, § 38
(1973).
102 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 306 (McKinney 1972).
103 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 12-63 (1972).
'4 See, e.g., Bornstein v. State Tax Comm'n, 227 Md. 331, 337, 176 A.2d 859,
861-62 (1962); Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 217, 209 A.2d
397, 400 (1965). See also KEITH, supra note 4, at 445-46.
105 See, e.g., De Luz Homes Inc. v. San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 544, 562, 290 P.2d 544,
554 (1955); Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 44 Il1. 2d 428, 430,
256 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1970); First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 358 Mass.
554, 560. 265 N.E.2d 848, 852 (1971); Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision v. One Euclid
Co., 16 Ohio St. 2d 43, 46, 242 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ct. App. 1968); Kargman v. Jacobs,
113 R.I. 696, 706-07, 325 A.2d 543, 549 (1974) (Joslin, J., dissenting). See CAL. REV.
& TAX CODE § 110 (West 1970) ("the amount at which property would be taken in
payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor").
"I See generally Parvin, Market Approach to Value, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE
APPRAISING 85 (E. Friedman ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as ENCYCLOPEDIA].
107 See generally Hollebaugh, Income Approach to Value, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
106, at 54.
108 See generally Johnson, Cost Approach to Value in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 106, at
37; Smith, Issues and Problems in the Valuation of Real Estate, N.Y.U. 30TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 209 (1972).
109 All facts regarding the property being valued should be carefully considered,
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ment review, most states require that all methods be considered
and provide that all such evidence is admissible. 110 The most
important element in selecting a method from the standpoint of
uniformity is the assessor's familiarity with the method. If the
assessor fails to apply properly all components of the chosen
method to the subject property, the resulting valuation will not
be correct and the local assessments will not be uniform.
a. Comparable-Sales Method
The comparable-sales method is recognized as the most ac-
curate method of determining market value."' The assessor
compares the subject property with recently sold properties of a
Similar nature." 2 The comparable-sales method is most often
used with residential property, because a sufficient number of
sales to provide a valid comparison can usually be found.1 13
Many factors are relevant in such a comparison-for example,
location, size, facilities, age, income, expenses, use, and type of
construction-and no single factor is controlling.'1 4 The proper-
ties compared need not be identical, as the aim is to show their
relative values by analyzing the characteristics of each, taking
into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and
and no single method of appraisal should be controlling. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.
Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 86, 291 A.2d 715, 720 (1971); New Brunswick v.
Division of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 544, 189 A.2d 702, 705-06 (1963); Heiman v.
Bishop, 272 N.Y. 83, 87-88, 4 N.E.2d 944, 945-46 (1936). Contra, Kargman v. Jacobs,
113 RI. 696, 704, 325 A.2d 543, 547-48 (1974) (choice of recognized methods within
the discretion of assessor).
110 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 10 (1973).
I" National Folding Box Co. v. New Haven, 146 Conn. 578, 584, 153 A.2d 420,
424 (1959). See Parvin, supra note 106, at 86; Smith, supra note 108, at 212. Smith labels
this method the "market data approach." Id. Arm's length sales of comparable property
that are recent and voluntary offer reliable evidence of value because they indicate
market opinion of value.
112 Previous sales of the subject property often provide the best evidence of market
value. See Samuel Hird & Sons v. Garfield, 87 N.J. Super. 65, 208 A.2d 153 (1965);
Lane Bryant, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 21 App. Div. 2d 669, 249 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1964), aff'd,
19 N.Y.2d 715, 225 N.E.2d 882, 279 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1967); State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1965), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
818 (1966). The requirements that the sale be recent and at arm's length are discussed
in Smith, supra note 108, at 217, 218-19.
"' See Santemma, Review of Real Estate Tax Assessments, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 685, 686
(1974).
114 McKnight Shopping Center v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 234, 209
A.2d 389 (1965). The difficulty is in the determination of whether two properties are
"comparable." The assessor must be able to analyze the characteristics that are impor-
tant in the market place, and to determine which characteristics are present in the
subject property and in the potential "comparables." See Smith, supra note 108, at
212-15.
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might be applied.'15 The major problem with the comparable-
sales method is locating a sufficient number of recent sales of
"comparables" to provide a reliable comparison." 6 Where none
at all is available, this method cannot be used.
b. RCNLD Method
This method, like capitalization of income," 7 is often em-
ployed when there are few "comparable" sales, 18 as in the case
of "specialty" buildings that are rarely, if ever, sold." 9 The
RCNLD method is applied to the building, while the com-
parable-sales method usually can determine the market value
of the land. 12" The RCNLD method entails computing repro-
duction cost-the amount, based on current market costs for
raw materials, labor, management, and capital, that would be
spent to provide a duplicate building in terms of facilities,
amenities, and space 2 '-and then adjusting for depreciation
(unless the building is brand-new). This method is most accurate
when the building is sufficiently new to ensure that a proper
depreciation factor can be calculated; 122 when the building is
old, valuation is difficult and therefore likely to be inaccurate.
The RCNLD method is often used as a check on the valua-
tions produced by the other methods, rather than as the sole
" Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 223, 209 A.2d 397,
402 (1965). The selling price of an otherwise comparable property can be adjusted for
differences in time and condition. For example, sales that are somewhat "old" can be
adjusted to current price levels. Parvin, supra note 106.
116 Four or five sales of comparable property are usually sufficient to permit accu-
rate valuation. Smith, supra note 108, at 215.
117 See text accompanying notes 126-78 infra.
ll Some types of properties are not sufficiently numerous in a particular area, nor
are they sold very often. Smith, supra note 108, at 215.
119 Such buildings include opera houses, stock-exchange buildings, and certain of-
fice buildings. See In re Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 18 App. Div.
2d 109, 238 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1963), aff'd 14 N.Y.2d 460, 200 N.E.2d 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d
460 (1964). In that case Seagram Company built a spectacular new office building for
its corporate headquarters, and the construction costs exceeded the market value al-
leged by the owner. Because the office building was unusual, the comparable sales
method could not be used. Also, the taxpayer's income calculation neglected the im-
puted income attributable to the owner-occupied parts of the premises, as well as the
publicity value of the building. The court held that the construction costs represented
the value of the building for tax assessment purposes at least for the tax years soon
after construction. The case was noted in 29 ALBANY L. REV. 158 (1965) and 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 1528 (1963).
120 This is sometimes referred to as the "land-residual" method.
121 See KEITH, supra note 4, at 473.
122 See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 18 App. Div. 2d 109,
238 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 314, 200 N.E.2d 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460
(1964).
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approximation of value. 123 It tends to set the upper limit on
value, because an investor probably will not pay more for an
existing building than the cost of building a substitute, even
when depreciation is taken into account. 124 Often, when an in-
sufficient number of comparable sales is available, assessment
boards and courts reluctant to rely on the capitalization-of-
income method 125 use the RCNLD method either as a check or
as the sole determinant of value.
c. Capitalization of Income
Capitalization of income is the prevailing method of determ-
ing the fair market value of commercial properties, especially
apartment buildings, office buildings, and shopping centers. 26
Commercial properties are essentially investments similar to cor-
porate bonds. The market value of any investment depends
upon the stream of income it is expected to produce over its
lifetime. 127 Capitalization involves estimating the annual income
to be generated over the life of the investment, and then apply-
ing a capitalization rate 28 to each annual amount to compute its
123 See Johnson, supra note 108, at 37-38.
124 There has been much disagreement over whether the RCNLD method sets an
upper limit on value. The New York courts hold that it does. Shereff v. Tax Comm'n,
42 App. Div. 2d 593, 345 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1973); Elmhurst Towers, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n,
34 App. Div. 2d 570, 309 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1970); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Podeyn,
32 App. Div. 2d 823, 302 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1969). Other states have rejected the New
York rule. Bornstein v. State Tax Comm'n, 227 Md. 331, 176 A.2d 859 (1962); Karg-
man v. Jacobs, 113 R.I. 696, 325 A.2d 543 (1974). Kargman's rationale is that income-
producing property sells frequently at a price higher than reproduction cost when the
property is new, well-managed, and tenanted; when the income is immediately availa-
ble; and when no additional capital, risk, or delay is required to create a good invest-
ment. This appears to represent the more economically valid rule. Gifford, Should Re-
placement Cost Impose a Ceiling on Real Property Tax Assessment?, 26 J. TAXATION 314
(1967).
125 Because capitalization of income involves computations based on estimates of
income, expenses, and interest rates, it can produce widely divergent results regarding
a given piece of property. The courts have urged that the method be used with care
and that the results be checked against all available data. E.g., Burritt Mut. Say. Bank v.
New Britain, 146 Conn. 669, 154 A.2d 608 (1959); New Brunswick v. State Div. of Tax
Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702 (1963).
,26 Ancel, Determining Fair Market Value of a Shopping Center for Purposes of Property
Tax Assessment, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 253 (1965); Sommer, supra note 78, at 477-78. But cf.
McCrory Stores Corp. v. Asbury Park, 89 N.J. Super. 234, 214 A.2d 526 (App. Div.
1965).
'
27 See Hollebaugh, supra note 107, at 54. See Koeppel & Kramer, Property Tax As-
sessments: Contract Rent is Fair Market Rent, Or Is It?, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 561 (1973).
128 The capitalization rate is the rate of return that an investor would require to
invest his capital in a particular investment. See Fisher, Capitalization Rates, 25 NAT'L
TAx J. 263 (1972); text accompanying notes 161-70 infra.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1418
present market value.' 2 9 The present values are then added to-
gether to derive the total market value. Two questions must be
addressed in applying this method: (1) How is income to be
computed? and (2) At what rate is income to be capitalized?
(i) Computing Income
When estimating future income, the assessor must compute
gross income (determined from actual figures or from estimates)
as well as the expenses (actual or estimated) to be subtracted
from gross income. The resulting net income figure represents
the annual income stream actually or predictably available to the
owner, and is therefore the proper figure to be analyzed in
determining present value.130 Average net income over a three-
to five-year period-stabilized net income-is often used in pro-
jecting future income.'
3 '
Conflict exists over whether to use actual (contract) rent or
fair rental value in computing gross income. The prevailing view
favors the fair'rental value standard. As stated in People ex rel.
379 Madison Avenue v. Boyland:1
32
Assessments cannot be made to trail behind every turn
in the fortunes of real property. There are times when
property must bear a share of taxation proportionate to
value even though it may then have no income, or an
income inadequately focused to true value. There are
times when the full measures of ephemeral surges of
increased income should not be reflected in assessments
in fairness to the owner.1 33
Fair rental value, rather than actual income, represents the earn-
ing capacity of the property and, according to the proponents of
fair rental value, that capacity should be considered for purposes
of taxation.' 34 Fair rental value is derived by comparing the sub-
129 Fisher, supra note 128. The present value is the amount of money that an inves-
tor would pay presently for the right to receive a particular stream of income in the
future. For example, given a 5% interest rate, an investor would pay $100 presently for
the right to receive $105 in one year. See generally WESTON & BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL
FINANCE 143-60 (3d ed. 1969).
"' See notes 126-28 supra & accompanying text.
13' See New Brunswick v. Division of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702
(1963); Ancel, supra note 126, at 258.
132 281 App. Div. 588, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 238 (1953).
133 Id. at 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
14 E.g., Clayton v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687 (Ct. App.
1972); Burritt Mut. Say. Bank v. New Britain, 146 Conn. 669, 154 A.2d 608 (1959);
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ject property to similar income-producing properties in the dis-
trict in regard to location, size, facilities, and tenants, with the
object of determining the rent that the owner should receive for
his space.'
35
The proponents of actual income fall into two groups. A
minority of the courts have held that actual income should be
given great weight unless the subject property dearly is not
being used for its highest and best use. 136 More recent cases
1 37
have held that actual income is the primary determinant of gross
income and may be disregarded only when the assessor can es-
tablish that the contract rent is less than fair rental value. These
cases recognize the importance of stability in assessed property
values, 138  but reasonably conclude that tenants are rarely
charged inadequate rentals. Thus in Parkview Village Associates v.
Borough of Collingswood,'3 9 the court held that actual rental in-
come from a large, well-managed apartment project was prima
facie evidence of gross income, rebuttable only by convincing
evidence to the contrary.
A problem arises in the use of actual income when commer-
cial properties are covered by long-term leases entered into
many years prior to the current assessment date and when the
rentals are therefore lower than current fair rental value.'
40
Even the most recent decisions accepting actual rental income as
Springfield Marine Bank v. Tax Appeals Bd., 44 Ill. 428, 256 N.E.2d 234 (1970); New
Brunswick v. Division of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702 (1963).135 E.g., Parkview Village Associates v. Borough of Collingswood, 62 N.J. 21, 297
A.2d 842 (1972). Fair rental value is based on the highest and best use of the property,
whether or not the property is currently so employed. E.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.
v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 291 A.2d 715 (1971). The Federated Dep't Stores
case is interesting because the court valued that portion of the land being used as a
parking lot on the basis of its full department store use, although a parking lot was
necessary to create the full value of the store itself.
136 Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 A. 184 (1934); Mid-Island Shop-
ping Plaza, Inc. v. Podeyn, 25 Misc. 2d 972, 204 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 14
App. Div. 2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 249, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 966, 180 N.E.2d 63, 224
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1961).
,37 Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 291 A.2d
715 (1971); Parkview Village Associates v. Borough of Collingswood, 62 N.J. 21, 297
A.2d 942 (1972); Caroldee Realty Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 73 Misc. 2d 41, 340
N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1972); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commission of Tax and Assess-
ment, 26 App. Div. 2d 759, 272 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1966).
'3 See New Brunswick v. Division of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702
(1963).
139 62 N.J. 21, 297 A.2d 842 (1972).
140 In the leading case of People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Comm'n, 17 App. Div. 2d 225,
233 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1962), the court declined to use a depression lease rental as evidence
of gross income.
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prima facie evidence of fair rental value 141 distinguish clearly the
long-term-lease situation. Their theory is that other taxpayers in
the district should not be made to bear larger tax burdens be-
cause the taxpayer-owner is bound by a disadvantageous lease.
Underlying this position is the view that where actual rental in-
come is less than fair rental value, the tenant has a "bonus" lease
to the extent of the difference, and its value plus the owner's
actual rent equals the taxable value of the property.
42
Using the fair-rental value in the long-term-lease situation,
however, is difficult to reconcile with the basic theory of prop-
erty valuation for tax purposes. Most of the decisions requiring
the use of fair rental value purportedly base this result on the
statutory standard for valuation 43 but fail to recognize that mar-
ket value is the actual statutory standard. As pointed out by the
court in Caroldee Realty Corp. v. Board of Assessors,'144 the tradi-
tional definition of market value is the price acceptable to the
willing buyer and the willing seller.' 45 Commercial property is
normally purchased for investment purposes, with a primary
concern for the stream of income that actually will be available to
the investor in the immediate future. 46 A prudent investor
would not buy property at a price which reflected fair rental
value when actual income under the long-term lease is signifi-
candy less. This would amount to paying for income that he
would never receive. The market value of such property must
reflect the terms of the lease for its duration: 147 to assess the
taxpayer based on fair rental value is to disregard the economic
realities of the situation.'
48
Yet in cases in which the owners are responsible for the
diminished income of the property-where expenses or vacan-
cies are higher than normal due to inefficient management-the
owners should be taxed on the full earning capacity of the prop-
erty, and thereby be made to assume their share of the tax bur-
den. In such cases. the market value will reflect full earning
capacity. Potential owners will be willing to pay more than the
"41 See cases cited note 137 supra.
1
42 See 1 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 497-504 (1937); Note, The
Valuation of Leaseholds for Ad Valorem Property Tax Purposes-The Reasonable Assessor
Standard, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 136.
143 Text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
114 73 Misc. 2d 41, 340 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
145 Cases cited note 105 supra.
146 See Hollebaugh, supra note 107, at 58-60; Koeppel & Kramer, supra note 127.
147 Cf. Koeppel & Kramer, supra note 127, at 570.
148 An alternative solution entails separate taxation of "bonus" leases, with the tax
to be levied directly on the lessee. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 59, § 11 (1973).
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capitalized value of actual income because they believe that bet-
ter management will decrease vacancies or cut expenses.149 The
use of fair rental value in these circumstances is economically
realistic as well as consistent with the policy of reducing the
effect of managerial astuteness on property assessments. 50
Once gross income is determined by using either fair or
actual rental value, expenses must be subtracted to calculate net
income for purposes of capitalization. Despite its importance in
the valuation of income-producing property, there is little case
law on the question of which expenses may be considered in
calculating net income. The oldest cases, such as Somers v.
Meriden, ' 5 used full gross income and adjusted the capitalization
rate upward for expenses. The court in Somers recognized the
existence of certain norms regarding operating expenses for dif-
ferent types of income-producing property, and the possibility of
adjusting the capitalization rate accordingly.1
52
When fair rental value is used to calculate gross income,'
53
the courts have used estimates of expenses for average business
years to calculate a stabilized net income.' 54 Expenses directly
reflected in investors' calculations of market value-expenses
that are expected to remain fairly constant in the future' 55-
should be considered. Such expenses include vacancies, amorti-
zation costs, operating expenses (including maintenance and re-
pair), and management fees.' 56 Property taxes should not be
149 These cases must be distinguished' rom those in which the discrepancy between
fair and actual rent is not attributable to inefficient management and therefore not
reducible by a purchaser. Where the discrepancy is not under the control of the pur-
chaser but results solely from the provisions of a long-term lease, fair value would
overstate true market value and consequently would be an inappropriate basis for as-
sessment. See text accompanying notes 152-57 supra. On the other hand, a purchaser,
unlike the original owner, justifiably could be taxed on fair rental value if the lease
were "bad" when made. Once apprised of the existence of such a tax, a prospective
purchaser could determine whether a long-term lease is "bad," and, as an investor,
should adjust the purchase price to reflect the taxes that he knows will be imposed.
10See New Brunswick v. Division of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702
(1963): "[Ihe valuations of properties for local taxation cannot vary with the manage-
rial successes or failure of the owners. Adjacent properties of equal potential cannot be
assessed differently because one proprietor was more or less astute than the other." Id.
at 539, 189 A.2d at 706.
"I' 119 Conn. 5, 174 A.184 (1934).
152 For example, if operating expenses were normally 50% of gross income, and the
capitalization rate for net income were 8%, then the capitalization rate representing a
proper return based on gross income would be 16% (.08/.50).
See notes 132-42 supra & accompanying text.
154 See cases cited note 134 supra.
x See New Brunswick v. Division of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702
(1963); Hollebaugh, supra note 107, at 56-59; Smith, supra note 108.
156 Hollebaugh, supra note 107, at 57-58. The amortization expense, commonly re-
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deducted as an expense but should be included as part of the
capitalization rate; it is unsound to deduct as an expense an
amount that is affected by the end product of the calculation.1
5 7
The theory of fair rental income discussed previously'
58
suggests that estimated "fair" expenses rather than actual ex-
penses should be deducted from gross income. Using such esti-
mates provides desirable stability, and prevents tax avoidance in
cases of inefficient management. A recent case' 59 indicated that
it is often appropriate to give actual expenses prima facie validity
as "fair" expenses, and to require the assessor to prove that the
management is inefficient and actual expenses are above the
riorm. Where management is efficient, the market value should
closely approximate the capitalized value of actual net income.
Potential owners will have no reasonable expectation of increas-
ing profits through better management and therefore will be
unwilling to offer a price higher than that capitalized value.'
60
(ii) Capitalization Rate
The determination of the proper rate of capitalization is the
most important, and the most difficult, step in valuation by the
capitalization-of-income method.' 6 ' As noted earlier, 6 2 the
capitalization rate is a discount factor that converts a future
stream of income into a present value; also, this figure repre-
sents the rate of return that an investor expects to receive from
a particular investment.' 63 In determining the capitalization rate,
the focus is upon the rate of return that investors in the particu-
lar kind of property actually require and receive.'
64
The capitalization rate is made up of many factors, and
which factors are to be included will depend upon how net in-
ferred to as depreciation, can be included in the capitalization rate rather than being
deducted from gross income as an expense.
157 KEITH, supra note 4, at 513.
1'8 See notes 132-35, 143-49 supra & accompanying text.
1-9 Parkview Village Associates v. Borough of Collingswood, 62 N.J. 21, 297 A.2d
842 (1972).
160 When sufficient evidence supports rejection of actual expenses, alternative
means of estimating future expenses are available. The Urban Land Institute, for ex-
ample, provides figures of normal operating expenses. See Ancel, supra note 126, at
258.
'"' BONBRIGHT, supra note 142, at 259.
162 See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
163 See Hollebaugh, supra note 107, at 55; Smith, supra note 108, at 231.
164 Burritt Mut. Say. Bank v. City of New Britain, 146 Conn. 669, 154 A.2d 608
(1959); City of New Brunswick v. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 189 A.2d 702
(1963).
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come has been calculated. In each case the rate must include an
interest factor-the monetary return on the invested capital.
165
If amortization of the investment (through depreciation)16 6 has
not been deducted from gross income as an expense, then de-
preciation must be reflected in the capitalization rate.167 Finally,
the capitalization rate must be increased to take into account the
effective rate of property tax that will be paid. 68 The capitaliza-
tion rate then reflects the return required by investors on in-
come before property taxes, which is the net income to be
capitalized.' 69 The three basic methods for determining the es-
sential rate, prior to adjustment for expenses, are the summation
method, the comparable-rate method, and the band-of-invest-
ment method.'
70
The summation method is an attempt to analyze the various
characteristics of a particular investment and assign to each the
rate of return required to compensate the investor. The primary
factor is the safe rate-the rate of return which a fine deposit or
treasury bill would produce.'17  Other factors are added to the
safe rate: a risk rate to compensate the investor for assuming the
danger of loss of the invested capital, a liquidity rate to compen-
sate for the potential loss in value if the investor is forced to sell
on short notice, and a further rate to cover any management
costs that have not been deducted as an expense. 172 After these
65 See text accompanying note 171 infra.
166 See note 156 supra & accompanying text.
167 The capitalization rate is increased only with respect to that part of net income
which is attributable to the depreciable improvement. See City of New Brunswick v.
State Div. of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J. 537, 549-50, 189 A.2d 702, 708-09 (1963).16 See text accompanying note 157 supra.
169 A short numerical example may be helpful:
5% interest factor
4% amortization (5% depreciation factor multiplied by 80% of income from
building)
2% taxes (4% tax rate multiplied by 50% assessment ratio)
11% capitalization rate
The 5% interest rate is a minimum rate, because it has not been adjusted for additional
risks inherent in most real estate investments. See text accompanying note 172 infra.
The amortization figure reflects a 20-year life, with straight-line depreciation. The tax
rate is adjusted because taxes actually to be collected are usually based on a percentage
of fair market value.
170 See Hollebaugh, supra note 127, at 60. See generally Ancel, supra note 126; Fisher,
supra note 128.
171 Fisher, supra note 128, at 263. This rate of return is called the safe rate because
it is virtually guaranteed, and there is little or no risk that the invested capital will be
lost.
172 Id.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1418
rates are added, additional rates for amortization and taxes are
included when necessary.
1 73
The comparable-rate method is analogous to the compar-
able-sales method.174 The procedure is to find investments
similar to the subject property in terms of risk, liquidity, and
management and tax costs, and then to determine the rate of
return generated by these investments. The amount of the in-
vestment and the stream of income generated by the investment
are the essential variables. As with the comparable-sales method,
the comparable-rate method requires a sufficient num-
ber of comparable investments to permit a reliable compari-
son.
1 7 5
The final method, the band-of-investment method, entails
deriving a capitalization rate through the use of interest rates for
equity and mortgage money. 176 Prevailing rates for mortgage
money are weighted according to how the property is financed.
The equity rate is then added, also weighted according to the
financing arrangement.'7 7 The equity rate presumably would be
determined by using either the summation method or the
comparable-rate method, both of which reflect the rate of return
investors require on their money, given the risks involved in the
investment. 
78
2. Proving a Common Ratio
A second aspect of many appeals is proof of the common
ratio within the taxing district. The property owner has shown
his assessment to be invalid when he establishes that his property
has a higher ratio of assessed value to market value than exists
generally within the taxing district.'7 9 When the common ratio is
1'3 Notes 156-57 supra & accompanying text.
174 See text accompanying notes 111-16 supra.
,75 Fisher, supra note 128, at 264.
,76 Ancel, supra note 126, at 261.
'7 The equity rate, therefore, represents the actual cost of capital as it is employed
in the investment. Fisher, supra note 128, at 264. For example, if property were fi-
nanced 80% with an 8% mortgage and the investor required a 15% return on his
equity, the capitalization rate would be:
.80 x .08 = .064
.20 x .15 = .030
.094 = 9.4% capitalization rate
178 See Smith, supra note 108, at 231.
179 Campbell Chain Co. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. App. 3d 248, 90 Cal. Rptr.
501 (1970); Hutensky v. Town of Avon, 163 Conn. 433, 311 A.2d 92 (1972); Feder v.
City of Passaic, 105 N.J. Super. 157, 251 A.2d 457 (App. Div. 1969); Lunkenheimer
Co. v. Board of Revision, 41 Ohio App. 2d 27, 322 N.E.2d 133 (1974); Deitch Co. v.
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set by statute at a specified percentage, the determination is
straightforward: the market value previously determined °80 is
multiplied by the statutory percentage' 8' and compared with the
value arrived at by the assessor. If the assessor's figure is higher,
the taxpayer is entitled to have his assessment reduced to the
lower figure.'8 2 When no statutory ratio is designated, the tax-
payer is entitled to be assessed at the average percentage actually
applied within the district.'
8 3
Even when the percentage required by statute or announced
by the assessor has been applied to the subject property, the
challenging taxpayer may show that the common ratio actually
applied throughout the taxing district is lower than the per-
centage required by statute or announced by the assessor. This
procedure is important when the assessed value of the subject
property reflects the proper fixed percentage of market value
but the taxpayer believes that the assessor has not uniformly
applied that percentage throughout the district. The proof of an
actual common ratio is an extremely difficult task, and litigation
of this type has been limited.' 8 4 The general procedure in prov-
ing such a common ratio is to perform sales-ratio studies,
8 5
collecting evidence of the ratio of assessed value to market value
for other real estate within the taxing district. 8 6 In those juris-
Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397 (1965). See generally Sommer,
supra note 78, at 483-85 (New York procedure).
The term "common ratio" implies that some degree of uniformity exists in the
application of the specified percentage. Where assessment is so chaotic that no common
ratio exists, the taxpayer may be permitted to establish the arithmetic mean of the
percentages actually applied and to obtain a reduction of his own assessment to this
level. See Continental Paper Co. v. Village of Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300
A.2d 850 (App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 63 N.J. 328, 307 A.2d 850 (1973). See generally
Cheng, The Common Level of Assessment in Property Taxation, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 50, 51
(1970).
180 See text accompanying notes 98-178 supra.
1s1 See note 72 supra & accompanying text.
182 See cases cited note 179 supra.
18' See, e.g., Feder v. City of Passaic, 105 N.J. Super. 157, 251 A.2d 457 (App. Div.
1969); In re Brooks Bldg., 391 Pa. 94, 137 A.2d 273 (1958).
184 Carr, supra note 14, at 885-87. Ehrman, supra note 77, at 15. Hezel, supra note
69, at 417-19.
185 Actual sales of other properties within the same taxing district are examined.
The sale prices are regarded as evidence of fair market value, and the assessed value of
each property is compared to the sale price to determine the assessment ratio. See
Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 218-19, 209 A.2d 397, 402
(1965); see Sommer, supra note 78, at 484.
186 All jurisdictions maintain that a showing that selected parcels have been assessed
at a lower ratio is insufficient to prove inequality; the taxpayer must establish that a
lower ratio has been applied throughout the relevant geographical unit. Glidden Co. v.
County of Alameda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 371, 85 Cal Rptr. 88 (1970) (county); Feder v. City
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dictions where real estate comprises a single class entitled to
uniform treatment,' 87 all real property should be available for
use in the study.'8 8 The problem is gathering sufficient data to
ensure a representative sales-ratio study that will persuade a
court or an appeals board.'8 9
In order to encourage taxpayers to challenge assessment
practices that produce illegally nonuniform ratios of assessed
value to market value, several alternative methods of proof have
been suggested. Some of the most successful challenges have
been based on computer studies of assessments and sales which
have generated data on existing common ratios.' 90 Computer
studies of the required magnitude, however, are extremely ex-
pensive, and are therefore available only to taxpayers who can
bear these costs.' 9 '
A less costly alternative was accepted in the New York case
of In re Mid-Island Shopping Plaza, Inc. v. Podeyn.192 Tables of
random numbers were used to select samples of real estate sales
within the district. In each case, the assessed value was compared
with the sale price' 93 to determine the ratio.' 94 The court stated
that where a sufficient number of sales was tabulated, this
method produced a reliable and representative sample of the
actual ratios applied to properties within the district.195
Another method of proving a common ratio different from
of Passaic, 105 N.J. Super. 157, 251 A.2d 457 (App. Div. 1969) (city); Pollack v. Reed,
47 App. Div. 2d 842, 366 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1975); Lunkenheimer Co. v. Board of Revision,
41 Ohio App. 2d 27, 322 N.E.2d 133 (1974) (state); Note, supra note 14, at 1382.
Ma See cases cited note 34 supra.
188 Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 223, 209 A.2d 397,
402-03 (1965).
1 8 9 
Id.
190 See cases cited note 56 supra.
191 If successful methods of attack require the use of expensive techniques, regres-
sive effects on the uniformity of the system may result. See Rosett, Inequity in the Real
Property Tax of New York State and the Aggravating Effects of Litigation, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 66
(1970).
192 25 Misc. 2d 972, 204 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1960), aff'd, 14 App. Div. 2d 571, 218
N.Y.S.2d 249, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 966, 180 N.E.2d 63, 224 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1961).
193 The sale prices were determined from the transfer tax (documentary) stamps
attached to the deeds. Id. at 976, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 15. The sale prices also could have
been obtained from the assessor, who is likely to keep records of such information, or
from the state board of equalization, which often performs its own sales-ratio studies.
194 It is important in this type of case to require the assessor to reveal the assess-
ments of those properties that are randomly selected for the study. See notes 81-84
supra & accompanying text.
19 1This method assumes that sale prices reflect the fair market value of the various
properties. Each sale must therefore be examined to verify that it was conducted at
arm's length and between parties of equal bargaining power.
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the percentage required by law relies on sales-ratio studies exe-
cuted by the state board of equalization. 96 In jurisdictions which
do not set a statewide fixed percentage, it is necessary to equalize
state tax rates among the various counties to ensure that the state
constitutional requirement of uniformity is met. In the course of
performing its equalization function, the state board normally
conducts its own sales-ratio studies for each taxing district, and
then adjusts the ratio for each district to create uniformity. Even
where a statewide percentage is set by law, studies are often done
to monitor the success of assessors in each district in maintaining
the assessment system at the statewide fixed percentage.' 97 It
would be reasonable, as many legislatures have recognized,' 98 to
require that the state board publish its sales-ratio data and to
accord these studies probative value in taxpayer appeals as evi-
dence of actual common ratios. In California, for example, the
local appeals board is now required to accept as the actual ratio
the lowest of: the ratio announced by the assessor, 115 percent
of the ratio determined by the state board, and the ratio proved
by the taxpayer.' 99 In view of the problems involved in proving
actual ratios, it seems both fair and desirable to make additional
evidence for proof of inequality available to the taxpayer.
20 0
B. Judicial Review
After exhausting the available administrative remedies, the
taxpayer may seek judicial review of his assessment. 20' Statutes
in most jurisdictions provide for such an appeal,20 2 but signifi-
cant differences exist in the scope of review that the courts will
196 See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 1815, 1817-19 (West 1970), as amended, (Supp.
1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 10-IOA (1973); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§§ 1200-02 (McKinney 1972); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.07 (Page 1973).
19
7 See Carr, supra note 14, at 887.
198 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 1818-19 (West 1970), as amended, (Supp.
1976); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720 (McKinney 1972).
'99 CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 1605 (West 1970); Ehrman, supra note 77, at 16. But
see Glidden Co. v. County of Alameda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 371, 85 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970)
(taxpayer not entitled to assessment in accordance with state board ratio absent a show-
ing that value determined by state board was equal to fair market value).
200 See Fusfeld & Kowalski, Reforming the Michigan Property Tax, 49 MIcH. S.B.J. 13,
18 (July 1970).
202 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-111, -118 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 58A, § 13 (Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5717.01, .04 (Page 1973). The
exhaustion requirement has been strictly applied. See, e.g., Grossman v. Board of Trus-
tees, 44 App. Div. 2d 259, 354 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1974).
202 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-118 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
58A, § 13 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 700-26 (McKinney 1972); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 5717.04 (Page 1973).
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undertake. Some states limit review to the procedures and
methods employed by the local board and the assessor and con-
sider only whether the procedures were illegal, fraudulent, or
arbitrary, °3 or whether the valuation was illegal, arbitrary, or
intentionally discriminatory. 204 When the assessor and adminis-
trative agencies have employed recognized methods, the prop-
erty is deemed to have been properly assessed. 05 This narrow
scope of judicial review, although consistent with the general
theory of administrative expertise, 0 6 is inappropriate in the area
of real estate assessments. There is little indication that local
appeals boards have the technical expertise in commercial real
estate appraisal that would justify judicial deference.20 7 Few
states prescribe any qualifications for persons sitting on these
local boards,20 8 and there is no indication that their members are
more qualified than trial judges to render proper decisions.
Moreover, limiting relief to cases involving improper methods
would be inconsistent with the constitutional and statutory re-
quirements of proportional taxation; those requirements are
more result- than means-oriented, and relief should not be so
limited.20 9 Given the difficulty of the subject matter, as well as
the heavy burden of proof on the taxpayer, a broader scope of
judicial review should be available.21 0
203 See, e.g., Weil v. Supervisor of Assessments, 266 Md. 238, 292 A.2d 68 (Ct. App.
1972) (courts cannot be required to act as a board of review for property assessments).
See also Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 332.
204 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 1611 (West Supp. 1976). This includes an "abuse of
discretion" standard under which mere errors of judgment are insufficient to warrant
reversal. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Tax Appeal Bd., 267 Cal. App. 2d 830, 73
Cal. Rptr. 469 (1968); Ehrman, supra note 77, at 21. Where a statewide appeals board
has been created, the standard of judicial review is usually whether the decision of that
board is supported by substantial, credible evidence on the record as a whole. See, e.g.,
Parkview Village Associates v. Borough of Collingswood, 62 N.J. 21, 297 A.2d 842
(1972).
205 Weil v. Supervisor of Assessments, 266 Md. 238, 292 A.2d 68 (1972).
206 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402 (1941).
207 See Carr, supra note 14, at 883-84. The special statewide appeals boards for the
review of assessments, on the other hand, have specially qualified members, who receive
judicial recognition of their expertise. See, e.g., City of East Orange v. Township of
Livingston, 103 N.J. Super. 109, 113-14, 246 A.2d 722, 725 (App. Div. 1968).
208 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:3-2 (Supp. 1975) (requiring citizenship in county
comprising the taxing district).
209 Contra, Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 348 Mass. 366, 203 N.E. 2d
811 (1965).
210 The arguments for broader judicial review in a somewhat different context are
set out in Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication
of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 471-75 (1954).
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Many states have adopted this view and permit de novo
review of assessments. Thus, the reviewing court makes its own
findings of market value2 1 ' and common ratio.21  Overvaluation
by the lower agencies is sufficient to justify redress. This broad
scope of review permits courts to grant relief without attributing
to the assessor or the local boards the mala fides implicit when
relief is granted under the narrower scope of review. 213 When
the appeals board's expertise is questionable and the remedies
obtainable from a reviewing court are adequate,21 4 the additional
"bite at the apple" provided by de novo review is likely to prom-
ote equality by reaching and remedying errors that went uncor-
rected by the lower agencies and would not be corrected under
the narrower scope of review.
The adoption of de novo review also introduces some dif-
ficulties. In substantively reviewing real estate assessments, the
courts are performing a function that generally is outside the
range of judicial expertise, 21 5 and therefore expert testimony
almost always will be required in establishing market value and
in challenging the common ratio. Thus, effective appeals may be
available only to taxpayers with the resources to obtain expert
witnesses. Because the appeal procedure is a necessary tool for
attaining uniformity and equality in a real estate tax system, 216 it
is important that appeals be widely available.21 7 Massachusetts
has recently instituted an alternative, informal procedure for
handling taxpayer appeals. 218 Under this procedure, the Appel-
late Tax Board may eliminate most formal rules of pleading,
211 See, e.g., Dickau v. Town of Glastonbury, 156 Conn. 437, 242 A.2d 777 (1968);
McKnight Shopping Center, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 234, 209
A.2d 389 (1965).
212 See, e.g., Rek Inv. Co. v. City of Newark, 80 N.J. Super. 552, 194 A.2d 368
(App. Div. 1963).
213 Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 335.
214 The relief that should be granted is reduction of tax liability to the level at
which it would have been set if the common ratio had been applied uniformly through-
out the taxing district. See text accompanying notes 219-24 infra.2 1" See Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 336.
216 See authorities cited note 14 supra.
217 Recent empirical studies indicate that the cost of court appeals has introduced
inequity into property tax assessment systems. Because the incentive to appeal is
strongest when the amount of the disputed tax is large, it is likely that only the com-
paratively wealthy taxpayers will appeal. See Rosett, supra note 191, at 66.
218 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 58, § 7A (Supp. 1975). This informal procedure
should expedite appeals and reduce substantially the expenses of litigation. See Leen v.
Board of Assessors, 345 Mass. 494, 188 N.E.2d 460 (1963). The availability of such
procedures is limited, however, to disputes involving small parcels, and may require
waiver of rights to judicial review in certain cases.
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practice, and evidence, as well as some or all fees and costs. The
availability of this procedure should eliminate some of the in-
equalities inherent in litigation under the traditional system, and
should supplement the advances toward uniformity made cur-
rently through broad judicial review.
C. Remedies
Given a sufficiently broad scope of review, the courts have
held universally that when the taxpayer is able to prove overas-
sessment, he has the right to have his assessment reduced to the
percentage of market value at which other property is assessed
within the district.219 This is true even where the state has a
system of full value assessment and the reduction would be a
departure from the requirements of the state statute.
22 0
One result of the widespread availability of relief through
the reduction of the taxpayer's own assessment has been the
elimination of the mandamus remedy obtained in early cases
such as Switz22I and Bettigole.222 Because the reduction of the
assessment to the common level is an adequate remedy, tax-
payers have been limited to that remedy, and the courts gener-
ally have refrained from intervening further in the system.223
This trend also has eliminated the need for additional legislative
changes in reaction to mandamus orders. 24
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past fifteen to twenty years the states have made
significant advances toward improving the efficiency and uni-
formity of their real estate tax systems. Probably the strongest
objective evidence that greater uniformity has been achieved is
that between 1961 and 1971 thirty-eight states reduced the dis-
persion of common ratios within their taxing districts.
22 5
219 See cases cited notes 25, 179 supra; Hutensky v. Town of Avon, 163 Conn. 433,
311 A.2d 92 (1972).
220 See, e.g., Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10
(1961); In re Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961).
221 Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 58, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).
222 Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass..223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).
223 Sears Roebuck Co. v. Somerville, - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 693 (1973); State
ex rel. Corron v. Wisner, 23 Ohio App. 2d 1, 260 N.E.2d 608 (1970). But see Hellerstein
v. Assessor, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975) (ordering prospec-
tive full value assessment).
224 But see N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1976, at 30, col. 1 (discussing a bill pending in the
New York State Assembly which would legalize fractional assessment); note 67 supra.
225 See Welch, supra note 2, at 33.
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The improvement largely has been due to the authorization
of fractional assessment by the state legislatures. At the begin-
ning of the period under review, it was clear that the assessors
had established systems in which conformity to constititutional
and statutory valuation standards was the exception rather than
the rule. After the courts invalidated these systems as contrary to
legal requirements, the legislatures effectively improved them by
conforming the legal standards to the existing system. This
change increased equality by enabling taxpayers to detect overas-
sessment and thereby challenge and remedy such inequality.
Significantly, this improvement was made with no loss of simpli-
city in the system nor any additional burden on taxpayers who
sought to appeal their assessments.
The change to fractional assessment was often accompanied
by provisions making new information available to taxpayers.
Information such as local assessments and sales-ratio studies is
crucial; not only does it apprise property owners of existing con-
ditions in the taxing district, thereby exposing any overassess-
ment, but it also encourages taxpayer appeals by facilitating
proof that overassessment exists. This is expecially true about
sales-ratio studies, because where they are accepted as probative
evidence of a common ratio the taxpayer's chances of success are
significantly increased. As the sales-ratio studies become more
sophisticated and accurate, more states perhaps will accept such
data for purposes of appeal, thereby increasing the ability of
taxpayers successfully to challenge overassessments.
Also accompanying the change to fractional assessment was
the increased availability of administrative and judicial review.
One significant change was the creation of statewide administra-
tive appeals agencies with plenary review over the decisions of
local appeals boards. Staffed with properly qualified members,
such boards eventually will be given the deference on appeal
normally accorded to administrative agencies. The increased use
of broad judicial review, which led the courts away from a review
of methods of assessment and towards an examination of results,
was a further improvement. Broad judicial review significantly
improves equalty, by ensuring that a taxpayer who is overas-
sessed may obtain relief whatever the reason for overassessment.
The end product is a more equal system, in which taxpayers
have a right to be taxed, as well as assessed, uniformly.
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